Counseling Counsel for Children by Guggenheim, Martin
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 6 
1999 
Counseling Counsel for Children 
Martin Guggenheim 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Juvenile Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin Guggenheim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss6/13 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COUNSELING COUNSEL FOR CIDLDREN 
Martin Guggenheim* 
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: 
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS. By Jean Koh Peters. 
Miamisburg, Ohio: LEXIS. 1997. Pp. 917. $85. 
INTRODUCTION 
You are a lawyer working in juvenile court, representing chil­
dren in proceedings in which their parents are accused of being un­
fit. Your clients range in age from newborns to seventeen-year­
olds. At any one time you have 125 active cases on your docket. 
You work hard at your job, and you believe deeply in the rights of 
the children you represent. Occasionally, it occurs to you that you 
don't really have as good a sense as perhaps you should of your 
precise role and how you ought to discharge your responsibilities to 
your clients. But you don't ever seem to have the time to work 
through such theoretical issues. You are too practical to consider 
more than the need to get through your daily docket. 
Even though lawyers (and other representatives such as guardi­
ans ad !item) have been representing children in child protective 
proceedings for more than twenty-five years and are currently serv­
ing that function in every jurisdiction in the United States,1 there is 
no uniform definition of a lawyer's role and responsibilities in this 
context. As a result, lawyers have been remarkably free - or re­
markably burdened - to figure this out for themselves. Even 
worse, "in almost any state . . .  one will encounter within the state a 
deep disagreement about [one's] role" (p. 33). 
Few topics are in greater need of a book clarifying the law than 
the role of counsel in child protective proceedings. Lawyers repre­
senting children in child protective proceedings are entitled to clear 
answers about their role and the tasks they should undertake in the 
discharge of their duties. One of the virtues of Jean Koh Peters's 
* Professor of Clinical Law; Director, Clinical and Advocacy Programs, New York 
University School of Law. B.A. 1968, Buffalo; J.D. 1971, New York University. - Ed. I 
gratefully acknowledge the support from the Ftlomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg 
Research Fund at New York University School of Law and the fine research assistance of 
Eric Dorsch, N.Y.U. Class of 1998. 
1. In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5105-5107 {1994), which created the first nationwide incentive for appointing rep­
resentatives for children in all child protective proceedings. The statutes of every jurisdiction 
in the United States requiring the appointment of a representative for children in child pro­
tective proceedings are set forth in REPRESENTING CHILDREN, pp. 253-479. 
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book is to free lawyers from doubts about their role and to liberate 
them to discharge their responsibilities appropriately. 
Peters is an extraordinarily knowledgeable and thoughtful child 
advocate with substantial experience in representing children in a 
broad range of legal proceedings. She is also a gifted and reflective 
teacher of advocacy. As a scholar of children's rights who has 
trained students at Columbia and Yale in representing children 
under her supervision, Peters is perhaps better equipped to answer 
the profoundly difficult questions of role and responsibility than 
any other writer in the field. No one before her has come close to 
writing a book for the child advocacy audience that is as sophisti­
cated or wise as this one. 
Representing Children does many things. It establishes and de­
fines the role of counsel for children in child protective proceed­
ings. It tells lawyers what steps they should take in the course of 
their representation and why they should take them. It explains 
when lawyers ought to empower their clients and treat them as 
principals (as is the norm for lawyers and clients in other contexts). 
It also tells lawyers how they should determine what outcome to 
seek when a client is unable to express a preference for a particular 
outcome, or when a client's disability or immaturity makes it impos­
sible or inappropriate to follow the client's instruction. 
This book is, in my opinion, the definitive text of what lawyers 
should do in the role of a court-appointed lawyer for a child in a 
child protection proceeding. For this reason, it is required reading 
for all lawyers who represent children. But many others related to 
the field of child advocacy - including social workers, lawyers for 
child care agencies, prosecutors, and judges - would also profit 
enormously by reading it. Moreover, lawyers in other fields would 
be well-advised to read it for the nuggets of advice about what con­
stitutes effective advocacy and what steps a lawyer ought to take to 
secure a result for a client whenever the outcome is likely to be 
obtained, as is the case in child advocacy-related proceedings, 
through means other than a contested courtroom trial. 
Representing Children is fundamentally a book about strategic 
lawyering. Peters offers truly outstanding practical suggestions 
about how to represent a child effectively in a world in which the 
crucial decisions about the lives of children are made at meetings, 
not in the courtroom. Identifying interdisciplinary meetings as rep­
resenting our current best ideas about coordinating client needs, 
Peters hopes "that lawyers will eventually consider meeting practice 
more important than trial practice in the work of representing their 
clients" (p. 190). The chapter on the interdisciplinary meeting 
should be read by all advocates in all kinds of cases. It will, I pre-
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diet, become a valued treasure for clinicians teaching informal 
advocacy.2 
As far as addressing the challenges of representation, a small 
criticism is that Peters pays little attention to practical problems 
such as caseload management. · In many offices, such as the Office 
of the Public Defender in Chicago, lawyers routinely have active 
caseloads exceeding 300, sometimes reaching 600 cases.3 Surely 
lawyers with these choking caseloads will be unable to do most of 
what Peters advises they do. But this criticism is perhaps unfair. In 
Representing Children, Peters establishes a standard of practice by 
offering a complete vision of the tasks lawyers perform for children. 
There will be plenty of time, in the wake of her groundbreaking 
work, to address strategies for making it possible to undertake the 
appropriate tasks given the overwhelming reality. All advocates for 
children should be indebted to Peters for establishing the gold stan­
dard, even if few of us are ever actually able to achieve it. 
In this review, I plan to address only some of the many out­
standing ideas Peters sets forth in the book. Part I explores the 
core concepts involved in representing children and discusses Pe­
ters's views of when and why to empower children to control the 
advocacy of their representatives. Because lawyers for children are 
invariably compelled to decide what kind of lawyer they are to be 
- for instance, whether they will take their instructions about what 
outcomes to seek from their clients, whether they will decide for 
themselves what outcomes to try to achieve, or whether they will do 
neither - Peters devotes an appropriately substantial amount of 
time to the role of counsel for children. Part II analyzes the impli­
cations of Peters's advocacy proposals from a practical perspective 
and examines the likely impact of these proposals on her target au­
dience. Finally, Part III addresses problems with Peters's views on 
the role of counsel from a theoretical perspective. 
As will soon be apparent, I agree with Peters's views of what 
lawyers for children should do when representing their clients in 
2. Peters sees informal advocacy as crucial to successful lawyering in this field, and she 
offers sophisticated advice about how to become involved in meetings. Peters cautions 
against lawyers dominating discussions and makes two crucial points about listening. See p. 
174. First, in her experience when lawyers and nonlawyer professionals meet, "[i]t is often 
disarming and a relief to other attendees when a lawyer spends the first part of a meeting 
listening to and absorbing both the substantive and procedural aspects of the meeting." P. 
180. Disarming others in the same case makes good strategic sense. What makes even 
greater sense is paying sufficient attention to the expressed needs and interests of others so 
that the advocate is poised to make proposals that the others are likely to accept. Peters 
wants lawyers to learn about the other professionals in the case and to try to determine what 
is driving them and what they are most concerned with. Once this is known, the lawyer is 
ready to go into action and make proposals that factor in the needs and interests of these 
professionals and of the client. 
3. See Interview with Patrick Murphy, Public Guardian of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois 
(Apr. 11, 1997). 
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child protective proceedings. Indeed, in my opinion, this book of­
fers better advice on this subject than any other book ever written. 
But the theories that underlie Peters's practical advice are another 
matter. In the course of this review, and particularly in Part III, I 
will identify several problematic aspects of Peters's theories, all the 
while agreeing with the endpoint to which these ideas lead her. In 
particular, Peters's methodology leads her to recommend what law­
yers representing children ought to do by first undertaking the task 
of deciding what is best for children who are enmeshed in the foster 
care system. Then she directs that lawyers representing children 
pursue actions consistent with Peters's views about child develop­
ment. Though this methodology apparently has much to offer, I 
hope to demonstrate the hidden dangers lurking behind it. 
I. JusT WHAT ARE CmLDREN's LAWYERS ANYwAY? 
MOUTHPIECES FOR THEIR CLIENTS OR INDEPENDENT 
GUARDIANS ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THEIR 
CLIENTS' BEST INTERESTS? 
Lawyers who represent children are in desperate need of gui­
dance to help them articulate and understand their role. The most 
basic questions need answering. When are lawyers supposed to 
treat their child clients as the principals in the attorney-client rela­
tionship? When are lawyers free to disregard their clients' ex­
pressed instructions as to the objectives sought in the case? And 
when lawyers are free to decide for themselves what objectives to 
seek, how should they go about deciding what to do? Peters has 
answers to all of these questions, and more. 
Peters is sensitive to the problem of an undefined role for a 
child's representative, which would permit the lawyer to do what · 
the lawyer wants.4 Peters believes, as I do, that it is crucial to estab­
lish parameters for lawyers assigned to represent children that max­
imize the probability that different lawyers will do approximately 
identical things in the course of representing like children in like 
cases and that, at the least, lawyers will be advocating for like re­
sults in like cases. 
Peters is particularly insistent to avoid proposing a set of rules 
that frees lawyers to do whatever they want. As Peters has 
explained: 
This extreme form of best interests representation omits several of 
the most fundamental characteristics of lawyering. The lawyer-client 
partnership and dialogue is reduced to a one-person monologue 
wholly unchecked by the client. The client becomes an object, rather 
4. Throughout this review, I shall use the term "lawyer" or "counsel" to include any rep­
resentative for a child, including a guardian ad !item who may not be a member of the Bar. 
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than the subject, of the representation. The lawyer, usually agent, 
acts as the principal in the relationship.5 
For this reason, her avowed goal is to constrain the degree of dis­
cretion lawyers for young children have to decide for themselves 
which positions to advocate on behalf of their clients. 
A. Empowering Children to Set the Objectives in Their Cases 
Perhaps the easiest way to ensure uniformity is to require that 
lawyers presume their clients have a sufficient degree of knowledge 
and maturity to set the objectives in the case. After all, what makes 
representing children so different from representing adults is "that 
the child's lawyer . . .  is 'adrift without the anchor of a principal.' "6 
By defining the child as the principal, most of the difficult ethical 
issues are eliminated. 
For Peters, as for many other writers in the field,7 the wisest way 
to accomplish this is to advocate for the child's preferences.8 Thus, 
Peters instructs that lawyers for children operate under two "de­
faults" that are relevant to this issue. The first is a "competency 
default," and the second is an "advocacy default.'' Under the for­
mer, a lawyer should regard his or her client as unable 
to act in her best interests only where evidence independent of the 
representation demonstrates clear and specific limitations on the 
child's ability to understand information and make judgments. . . . 
[T]he decision that the child cannot adequately act in her own inter­
ests cannot be made until the child's maximum competence is fully 
explored by the lawyer. [p. 130; footnote omitted] 
5. Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering 
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1505, 1526 (1996). 
6. P. 34 (quoting Peters's conversation with Geoffrey Hazard on June 5, 1992). 
7. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowennent: Rethinking the Role of 
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1655 (1996); 
see also Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of their 
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699 (1996); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. 
England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am I?", 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917 
(1996). 
8. Although Peters does not discuss this point, it is important to recognize that there is a 
prominent counterpoint to empowering children. Some scholars have recognized the difficul­
ties posed by making the child's preference in a custody-related case a focus of attention. 
See, e.g., Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of 
Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 81 YALE L.J. 1126, 
1165 (1978). 
Psychology and moral theory both warn the attorney not to force participation on the 
child. If a client is entitled to participate and to be informed, he is also entitled to do neither. 
Studies of children of divorce indicate that there may be very good reasons for a child's 
decision not to become directly involved in the dispute over his custody, particularly where 
the parents have already framed any choice the child makes in terms of loyalty or treason. In 
certain situations and at certain stages of development, the child may wish to resolve a loy­
alty conflict by choosing, and that choice may serve important inner needs, but in other situa­
tions and stages the child may risk emotional turmoil and parental retribution by taking sides. 
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Under the "advocacy default," lawyers are generally expected to 
represent "the child's counseled wish, regardless of the lawyer's per­
sonal feeling about whether or not those wishes are prudent . . .  " (p. 
72). According to Peters, all children who can be counseled ought 
to be empowered to set the objectives for the case (p. 72). More­
over, there is no minimum age for making this category.9 
For Peters, whenever a child can express an opinion and can be 
"effectively counseled," the child is to control the lawyer's advo­
cacy. As Peters said in an earlier law review article: 
The only time the child's lawyer may advocate for a position other 
than that stated by the client, is after the lawyer, based upon in­
dependent evidence arising outside of the representation, has deter­
mined that the client's development or circumstances preclude the 
client from either expressing a position or being effectively counseled 
as to the viability of the position.10 . 
Peters, of course, does not envision that lawyers will automati­
cally yield to the child's initially articulated position. Instead, she 
expects lawyers to exercise skills as a counselor to advise the child 
of all of the options and the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
At the same time, however, she exhorts lawyers to avoid any at­
tempt to overly influence children in reaching the positions they 
want. She warns lawyers to resist their understandable temptation 
"to impose her own belief upon the client."11 In her words, 
although 
[i]t may be easier . . .  for a lawyer to seek to manipulate her client into 
accepting the lawyer's position instead of disciplining herself to advo­
cate zealously for the client's position . . .  [b ]ecause children are even 
more likely than adults to be cowed by a lawyer's strong recommen­
dation, the lawyer must approach a child client's choice with particu­
lar restraint.12 
B. When Children Cannot Set the Objectives 
Peters recognizes that there are circumstances when lawyers will 
not be able or, if able, not be required to advocate an outcome 
based on their clients' wishes. These are the many cases in which 
9. Peters, describing the concept of a minimum age, says: 
Sometimes a child will not have a clear position. This could be a non-verbal child or a 
child who could contribute a real but relatively small amount to their representation. 
Many people consider children under the age of four to be in this category. Children 
with particular disabilities may also fall into this category. 
P. 130. 
10. Peters, supra note 5, at 1565. 
11. See id. at 1521. 
12. Id. {footnote omitted); see also Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The 
Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1435, 
1458 (1996) {"The child's lawyer has an ethical duty to avoid using her superior skills and 
social position to silence the child's voice, or coerce the child into passive compliance with 
the lawyer's views."). 
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children are too young to speak or, though old enough to express a 
preference, not old enough for an adult to want to give substantial 
weight to their expressed desires. She even recognizes that a very 
large number of cases fall into this category. Nonetheless, most of 
the book is written as if the lawyer will be representing a client old 
enough to set the objectives for the case in a manner that binds the 
lawyer to seek that result. For the most part, the book advises law­
yers in the particulars of how to achieve the goals they seek and 
does somewhat less than expected in telling lawyers how to deter­
mine what goals they should seek. 
Peters has previously written very thoughtfully on the subject of 
precisely what lawyers should do when representing children too 
young to set the case's objectives. Instead of elaborating in the 
main volume of the book on this subject, however, Peters refers the 
reader to other articles - especially her own important Fordham 
Law Review article entitled The Roles and Content of Best Interests 
in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Pro­
ceedings,13 which appears in the book's appendices.14 
The Fordham Law Review piece is largely devoted to the subject 
of representing very young children in child protective proceedings. 
In Peters's words, when lawyers are representing "clients who can­
not be counseled," they "are called upon to do the biggest job of all: 
to determine the objectives of the client representation."15 Peters 
appreciates both the uniqueness and extraordinary difficulty of em­
powering lawyers to set the agendas for their clients: "[C]alling 
upon a lawyer to determine the goal of her own representation of a 
client, largely independent of that client's direct input and largely 
independent of the client's wishes, is an anomalous and deeply 
13. Peters, supra note 5. In December 1995, Fordham University Law School hosted a 
national conference on representing children that resulted in the publication of a special issue 
of the Fordham Law Review. See Special Issue, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of 
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1996). The conference was sponsored by thirteen orga­
nizations that constitute virtually the entire organized bar representing children. See Bruce 
A. Green & Bernardine Dohm, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1283 & n.7 (1996). 
14. Peters's product is an unconventional compromise in that the book is comprised of 
some 225 pages of text and an additional 670 pages of appendices. The core text contains 
only seven chapters. The appendices include a historical study of the development of child 
protective schemes and a listing and summary of statutes from all jurisdictions in the United 
States. Other appendices form an amalgam of materials, including some of Peters's prior 
writings and a synopsis of what other writers of child advocacy have said. A reader will not 
gain the full understanding of the role and tasks of lawyers representing very young children 
without a careful reading of Peters's Fordham Law Review article. I question, however, 
whether many readers will bother to read the appendices. I think both Peters and the pub­
lisher erred by dividing the book in this way, thus expecting somewhat more of the typical 
reader than is reasonable. 
15. Peters, supra note 5, at 1519. 
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complicated divergence from the usual path of legal 
representation. "16 
Roughly speaking, there are two categories of cases in which 
special advice needs to be given to lawyers when representing 
young children. First, lawyers are unable to advocate for the cli­
ent's expressed preference when clients are too young to express 
any wish. Second, lawyers are not required to do their. client's bid­
ding even when the client is old enough to speak if the client is not 
sufficiently mature for his or her wishes to be given controlling 
weight. The first category is mostly objective, involving newborns, 
infants, and young toddlers. Though its uppermost boundaries are 
indefinite, it is relatively easy to agree about which children are too 
young to express themselves. The second category is quite differ­
ent. Here we are talking about verbal children, and, consequently, 
there will be less agreement among lawyers representing children 
about which children are mature enough to deserve to have their 
views control a lawyer's advocacy. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know precisely when a client's 
views ought not to be binding on the lawyer. Peters does little to 
tell lawyers how to demarcate between verbal children whom law­
yers must heed and those whom they may not. But it is clear she 
prefers that lawyers err by deeming children mature enough to set 
the objectives. Although Peters fails to provide a definitive state­
ment, she instructs lawyers not to be bound by the stated wishes of 
their counseled clients only when the lawyer concludes that the cli­
ent "cannot adequately act in her own interests" (p. 130). But, it 
should be emphasized, Peters believes children at four years of age 
can often act in their own interests and, thus, should be permitted 
to set the objectives of the case (p. 72). Thus, under Peters's rule, it 
would seem that lawyers are obliged to allow their child clients to 
set the case's objectives in the vast majority of cases. 
This is a field, however, where the exception may actually be 
greater than the rule. This is so for two reasons. First, many chil­
dren in child protective proceedings are very young. Although it is 
difficult to obtain national data on the age of children who are the 
subjects of child protective proceedings, it appears that most chil­
dren are under eight years of age when the petition is first filed, and 
a high percentage are under three.17 Second, apart from the fact 
that many children in these proceedings are very young, in many 
jurisdictions the lawyer's role when representing children in child 
protective proceedings seems to require that the lawyer advocate 
the child's best interests, rather than the child's preferences, even 
16. Id. at 1522. 
17. See Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, 
Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 299, 327 & n.129 {1998). 
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when the children are not young. By Peters's count, thirty-one ju­
risdictions require lawyers in child protective proceedings to repre­
sent the child's best interests (app. B). If lawyers in those 
jurisdictions are required to advocate on the basis of the child's best 
interests, then the majority of children in the United States will not 
be empowered to set the objectives of their child protective case 
even when they are as old as fourteen or fifteen.ls 
For these reasons, it is crucial to explain the role of counsel for 
children when the attorney is not expected to advocate the client's 
preferred outcome. In her Fordham article, Peters identifies, criti­
ques, and ultimately rejects the four commonly used models law­
yers for children use when forced to choose what outcome to 
advocate: (1) The Total Lawyer Discretion Model; (2) The Expert 
Deference Model; (3) The Psychological Parent Model; and ( 4) The 
Family Network Model.19 The Total Lawyer Discretion Model is, 
as its name makes clear, the most open-ended of the four. The Ex­
pert Deference Model "defers the best interests decision to one of 
three kinds of experts in the case: one already involved with the 
child or family, one appointed by the court, or one retained by the 
attomey."20 
Peters rather quickly (and, in my view, appropriately) rejects 
the Total Lawyer Discretion Model as giving lawyers unbridled 
power they are untrained to exercise, because she is unwilling to 
empower randomly assigned members of the bar who are too likely 
to rely on their own values and biases when deciding what to advo­
cate. 21 She rejects the Expert Deference Model for the opposite 
reason - it prevents independent judgment by the lawyer. None­
theless, Peters supports a close working relationship with experts, 
such as social workers who may be on the staff in the office of the 
child's lawyer. She acknowledges, however, that this is an ex­
tremely expensive option that most lawyers are unable to use.22 
18. "If a lawyer's obligation is to represent the child's best interests, it appears that the 
child's counseled wish alone cannot be the sole input into the decision-making process." P. 
130. 
19. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1525-53. 
20. Id. at 1524. 
21. 
I believe that this level of discretion makes it inevitable that the lawyer will some· 
times resort to personal value choices, including references to his own childhood, stere· 
atypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ from his, and his own lay 
understanding of child development and children's needs, in assessing a client's best in­
terests. Especially for practitioners who must take cases in high volume, the temptation 
to rely on gut instinct, stereotype, or even bias is overwhelming. This jeopardizes the 
child client even more, as her unique circumstances are quickly distorted by a stranger 
through his own lens of experience and preconception. 
Id. at 1526. 
22. See id. at 1534. 
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Having rejected giving lawyers total discretion, and recognizing 
that few lawyers can afford the luxury of working with a team of 
experts who will assist them in determining the appropriate out­
come to pursue, Peters devotes most of her analysis to Models 
Three and Four. The Psychological Parent Model, in Peters's 
words, "relies upon principles enunciated by an eminent trio of 
scholars who have focused upon continuity of care, the perspective 
of the child, and the psychological parent as crucial principles guid­
ing all determinations of 'best interests.' "23 The Family Network 
Model "proposes instead a child welfare analysis focusing on pre­
serving the child's family network."24 
The developers of the Psychological Parent Model - Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit - posit a child's need 
to develop an "unbroken continuity of affectionate and stimulating 
relationships" with an adult.25 Accordingly, these writers argue 
that courts deciding child placements should award sole and exclu­
sive custody to the psychological parent: the adult who "on a con­
tinuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, 
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a 
parent, as well as the child's physical needs."26 Further, to 
strengthen and protect the psychological child-parent relationship, 
courts must divest themselves and others of all power over the child 
and the child's rearing. 
Adherents of the Psychological Parent Model also suggest that 
courts should terminate the parental rights of any adult outside the 
psychological child-parent relationship.27 Courts should do this 
when termination means banishing a biological parent in favor of 
the psychological parent who also happens to be a biological par­
ynt, and courts should also do this when termination means ban­
ishing a biological parent in favor of a foster parent.28 
23. Id. at 1524. She is referring to the work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert 
J. Solnit. See id. at 1537-38 & n.63. 
24. Id. at 1524. This model has been developed by the work of Peggy Davis, among 
others. See infra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
25. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST !NrERESTS OF THE Cmr.o 6 {1973) 
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST !NrERESTS]; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE {1996) [here­
inafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST !NrERESTS ]. 
26. GOLDSTEIN ET AL, THE BEST !NrERESTS, supra note 26, at 98. The psychological 
parent could be the biological, adoptive, or foster parent, but the interests of the child dictate 
that the State must award custody of the child to the parent who has demonstrated the high­
est likelihood of developing the psychological child-parent relationship. Generally, this is 
defined by ascertaining which adult currently fills this role in the child's life. 
27. See id. at 35-36. 
28. See infra note 61. 
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In contrast, Peggy Cooper Davis, a proponent of the "family 
systems" perspective, aggressively challenges the core message of 
the Psychological Parent Model.29 In Davis's words: 
In contrast to the "out of sight, out of mind" theory that seems to 
underlie the recommendations of psychological parent theorists, clini­
cians responsive to multiple bonds have worked to develop ways for 
children in care to "mourn" or otherwise come to terms in explicit 
ways with feelings about their families of origin.30 
The Family Network Model challenges the "image of the psycho­
logical parent [who invariably] is the mother whose familiar pat­
terns of feeding, handling, and comforting the child cannot, without 
cost, be interrupted, even by the use of a baby-sitter."31 It comes at 
child development from the other end of the spectrum of the psy­
chological parent theorists. In Davis's view, the ideal child nurtur­
ing role involves encouraging children to experience separation 
from important caregivers. She recommends that parents view 
"everyday separations . . . as constructive learning experiences 
rather than as inflictions of inevitable damage."32 In thorough con­
trast with psychological parent theorists, family network theorists 
conclude that terminating the parental rights of foster children and 
banishing their families from them is a terrible harm inflicted on 
children. Rather, they would insist that "adults must transcend dif­
ferences of class, race, history, and parenting capacity to provide for 
each foster child as cooperative a network of care as the child's de­
cidedly disadvantageous circumstances will allow. "33 
Peters does not recommend that lawyers representing children 
faithfully adhere to either of these models. In her opinion, neither 
model does full justice to the complexities of choices facing courts 
obliged to decide such weighty matters as termination of parental 
rights. She very wisely warns lawyers for children not to "assume 
that all determinations of best interests can ultimately be delegated 
to others," even experts.34 She adds that lawyers "need to develop 
principled ways of determining best interests for themselves in cir­
cumstances where these experts are not available to them."35 
Peters's important point is that even experts involved in making 
recommendations about children start with certain assumptions 
about child development theory, whether or not these are stated, 
and "[i]n order to work effectively with medical, psychological, 
29. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent 
Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347 {1996). 
30. Id. at 363. 
31. Id. at 365. 
32. Id. at 368. 
33. Id. at 370. 
34. Peters, supra note 5, at 1534. 
35. Id. 
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mental health, and social work professionals, the child's attorney 
must understand the various best interests standards applied by 
professionals in these fields."36 
When removal of the child from home is likely, Peters recom­
mends that the child's lawyer "consider the child's current predica­
ment not in isolation, but in comparison to the actual alternative 
options that foster care provides."37 Peters wants lawyers to appre­
ciate the limitations of the state's beneficence. In jurisdictions 
where the foster care system lacks good homes in the vicinity, she 
warns that children's lawyers who only focus on what is inadequate 
about the parent's home may fail to consider that the state's pro­
posed alternative may be, in different respects, even more 
inadequate. 
Peters further advises that the child's lawyer should evaluate all 
of the alternatives available by considering the child's "family sys­
tem," the family's history, and the child's ordinary, daily life.38 In 
some cases, the child's family history will clearly justify reliance on 
the Psychological Parent Model, thereby assisting the lawyer in 
eliminating some options_from consideration.39 In other cases, the 
Family Network Model will be obviously appropriate, again helping 
the lawyer identify the correct options.4o 
· 
Peters's ultimate contribution is her effort to 'blend' these diver­
gent theories, thus creating an "integrated model [that] attempts to 
preserve the best of each paradigm while discarding the historically 
outdated or the unintentionally harmful."41 Peters subsequently 
gives lawyers advice about when to rely on which developmental 
theory and for what purposes. Peters especially likes the Psycho­
logical Parent Model because it ''requires the lawyer to strive con­
stantly to see the past, present, and future options from the child's 
36. Id. at 1565. 
37. Id. at 1555. 
38. See id. at 1566. 
39. Peters gives an example: 
For instance, a child who clearly had one primary caretaker from whom she
· 
has exper­
ienced a separation, and who is clearly in crisis, may also have no family network to 
speak of. Available alternatives which would place the child in a network of care with 
no single caregiver would appear to be inappropriate. 
Id. at 1555-56. 
40. Peters gives a different illustration for this proposition: 
[A] child clearly may be living in the midst of an inner city family network, with a belea­
guered potential psychological parent figure in crisis. If the network can support the 
child adequately, there may be no need to move the child to a foster home. It may also 
aid the child to shore up the psychological parent with supportive services, to afford the 
child the security of that special relationship. 
Id. at 1556. Peters elaborates on these different theories, explaining what distinguishes them 
from each other and how they are similar. I shall return to her analysis of these theories in 
somewhat greater detail in Part III. 
41. Id. at 1554. 
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point of view and to coax others constantly to do the same. "42 In 
cases in which there is a psychological parent who is able to care for 
the child, Peters argues that lawyers for children should seriously 
consider this person as the child's primary resource.43 In seeking to 
'blend' the Psychological Parent theory with Davis's Family Net­
work Model, Peters advises lawyers for children to "look beyond 
the traditional mother-child dyad to alternative family arrange­
ments which provide children with the stability needed for their de­
velopment through an integrated family network."44 
I am somewhat less confident than Peters in the applied utility 
of this analysis, at least insofar as it purports to provide lawyers 
with meaningful guidance as to what results to advocate in a given 
case. But Peters herself acknowledges that no paradigm will an­
swer all questions.4s Partly because of this, she proposes that when 
lawyers unavoidably are left to decide things for themselves, they 
be deliberately constrained by two additional concepts. First, law­
yers should "err on the side of seeking to keep the current family 
structure intact, while advocating aggressively for state interven­
tions that ameliorate the worrisome conditions in the home."46 
Second, the child's lawyer should always compare the result the 
lawyer is considering with the child's own desires.47 This latter con­
straint does not make a great deal of sense to me when it is applied 
to infants and toddlers. Peters seems to believe that lawyers for 
42. Id.. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. 
[R]esearch indicates that children develop multiple attachments to caregivers who can 
help them cope with separation anxiety and stress. The idea of "one psychological par­
ent" or "the primary parent" is a concept often emphasized by custody evaluators and 
within legal circles. This notion is controversial and has very little empirical support. 
There is usually a hierarchy of attachment figures, each of whom may have qualitatively 
different types of relationships with the child . . . .  
James H. Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affecting Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9 
BEHAv. SCI. & L. 419, 423 (1991) (citations omitted), quoted in Davis, supra note 29, at 361-
62. 
45. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1558. 
46. Id. (footnote omitted). 
This default implements a view that Goldstein, Freud, Soinit, and Goldstein, as well as 
Davis, and many concerned experts clearly share: the value of minimal state interven­
tion, the harm of precipitous removal of children, and the importance of seeking in every 
instance the least detrimental alternative. This default also acknowledges the trauma 
that the child will experience when she separates precipitously from her family. 
Id. at 1558 (footnote omitted). 
47. In Peters's words: 
Thus, in the end, the best interests determination must end where it began: with the 
attorney trying to see the decision to be made from the child's subjective perspective, 
with a focus on the child's uniqueness and individuality. This structure of decision mak­
ing, starting and ending with the child, considering the child's circumstances in light of 
the two paradigms, and seeking the input of experts when needed, reduces the range of 
lawyer discretion to acceptable levels. 
Id. at 1558-59. 
May 1999] Representing Children 1501 
extremely young children are capable of discerning the subjective 
desires of their clients. I do not. She also apparently believes that 
these children's desires are important guideposts for the lawyer's 
actions. Again, I do not. Finally, Peters advises that when the law­
yer concludes that more than one acceptable option exists, the law­
yer's job is to "present evidence and argument describing all these 
options to the court while also presenting evidence and argument 
opposing all rejected options."48 
Peters recognizes that lawyers will have very wide latitude to 
make choices for their clients, even if they faithfully adhere to her 
ways. As an antidote, Peters also proposes that lawyers always ask 
themselves "seven questions to keep us honest" (p. 65). Whenever 
a lawyer is about to make a choice in a case, Peters advises the 
lawyer to test herself with a series of questions. These questions 
are: 
1. In making decisions about the representation, am I making the 
best effort to assess the case, from my client's subjective point of 
view, rather than from an adult's point of view? (p. 65) 
2. Does the child understand as much as I can explain about what is 
happening in his case? (p. 66) 
3. If my client were an adult, would I be taking the same actions, 
making the same decisions, and treating her in the same way? (p. 
66) 
4. If I decide to treat my client differently from the way I would treat 
an adult in a similar situation, in what ways will my client con­
cretely benefit from that deviation? Is that benefit one which I can 
explain to my client? (p. 67) 
5. Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for the gratifi­
cation of the adults in the case, and not for that of the child? (p. 68) 
6. Is it possible that I am making decisions in the case for my own 
gratification, and not for that of my client? (p. 68) 
7. Does the representation, seen as a whole, reflect what is unique 
and idiosyncratically characteristic of this child? (p. 69) 
These questions will not, of course, tell lawyers what steps they 
should take at any given moment. But they are Peters's way of re­
minding lawyers that their clients are, after all, at the center of the 
case, and that the lawyer's chief task is to keep the client there at all 
times. 
II. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF HER PROPOSAL 
A. When Representing Children Who Set the Objectives 
Thus far, this review has briefly looked at the question �f how 
lawyers should determine what result to seek when representing 
children in child protective proceedings. In this section, I will con-
48. Id. at 1558. 
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sider the likely impact on practice that Peters's book will have if the 
bar assiduously follows her advice. 
One effect of her work may be to help reduce the unreasonable 
caseloads with which many lawyers are now saddled. One possible 
explanation for these absurdly high caseload levels is that adminis­
trators have not understood what lawyers for children could and 
should be doing to discharge their responsibilities. The administra­
tors may have believed it was sufficient to provide a child with a 
lawyer even if the lawyer could do nothing more than appear in 
court, in part because they could not imagine what the lawyer could 
or should be doing outside of court. Peters's book will make it eas­
ier to insist upon maximum caseloads for children's lawyers so that 
they can do what we should start expecting of them outside the 
courtroom. 
Although this book will be - and should be - of interest to 
judges, agency attorneys, lawyers for parents, law professors ( espe­
cially clinical law teachers), and scholars, it is likely that the book's 
primary audience will be lawyers who represent children. This seg­
ment of the bar needs and deserves a clearly written text that tells 
them what to do when representing children and why they ought to 
do it. I expect that the book will have its greatest impact on what 
lawyers actually do. 
If that is right, it is important to begin with Peters's powerful 
preference for insisting that lawyers take their instruction from 
their "counseled client"49 and to try to assess what impact this pref­
erence will have on lawyering. If Peters is successful in persuading 
lawyers to follow her advice, lawyers in an overwhelming number 
of cases will be advocating for results their clients want, even when 
the lawyers are unsure such advocacy is well advised. 
The question that naturally arises is: What are the preferences 
of children in most cases? Regrettably, there is no empirical study 
of which I am aware that reports the desires of children who are the 
subject of child protective proceedings. Based on my experience in 
twenty-five years of practice and my informal polling of lawyers in 
these proceedings, I conclude that most children most of the time 
want to stay with their families, or be returned as quickly as possi­
ble to their families if they have been removed. If I am right, law­
yers who follow Peters's advice will be doing what they can either 
to reunite children with families from which they have been re-
49. Peters is one of many significant voices who advocate the necessity of empowering 
children in the attorney-client relationship. But, as in all matters of lawyering, Peters is ex­
tremely thoughtful and reasonable. She does not advocate that lawyers merely ask their 
clients what they want and then expect lawyers to go out and try to accomplish that outcome. 
Only after a client has been counseled, and the lawyer actively participates in a conversation 
with the client about the range of available options and the pros and cons of each, would 
Peters expect the lawyer to be ready to do the client's bidding. See id. at 1521, 1565. 
May 1999] Representing Children 1503 
moved or to prevent removal in the first place. In my experience, 
many lawyers for children are exceedingly uncomfortable doing 
this. This discomfort may stem from a fear that a child will be 
harmed as a result of the lawyer's successful advocacy. Or it may 
derive from a belief that the child protective agency is an unworthy 
adversary that has not protected the child adequately or made an 
adequate case for separation. It may even come from a fear that 
the media or an administrator in the office will blame or rebuke the 
lawyer for taking a chance with the child's well-being.50 
In my experience, many adults connected with child protective 
cases treat children's expressed preferences quite differently, de­
pending on what the child says. When children say they want to go 
home, that wish is often received by adults the same way editors 
treat a story about a dog biting a man - they aren't going to run 
with it. On the other hand, when children say they do not want to 
go home, adults frequently will invoke the child's preference as a 
crucial factor to take into account. In this sense, children are em­
powered in an odd rachet-like manner. When, but only when, they 
do not want to go home, adults pay serious attention to their prefer­
ences. Peters is trying to change this. She really wants lawyers to 
take a child's preferences seriously, even when those preferences do 
not jibe with the lawyer's sense of a good outcome. 
B. When Representing Children Too Young to Set the Objectives 
Peters never quite provides definitive instructions to lawyers 
representing very young children regarding exactly what they 
should seek for their clients. I do not mean to criticize Peters for 
this failure. One cannot do more than provide a general prescrip­
tion of values and goals. Each case will necessarily contain its pecu­
liar characteristics requiring the exercise of sound judgment by 
well-meaning professionals. 
Even more interestingly, Peters's book raises questions of how 
much lawyers will continue to seek results based on the child's best 
interests, rather than the child's preferences, even in those jurisdic­
tions that expect lawyers to do so. Judges and legislators should 
recognize that Peters's preference for empowering children may 
50. Lost in this way of thinking is that all actions contain elements of risk and that chil­
dren may be harmed to a far greater extent by removing them from their families than by 
keeping them at home. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barna, Custodial Choices for 
Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 139 
(1995). Frequently, these points are lost because lawyers for children fail to obey one of 
Peters's principles: Always make decisions from the client's perspective. Tue reason these 
harms are not recognized, in other words, is that these harms do not directly impact the 
lawyer. When children are harmed by removal, lawyers for children are never blamed. 
When children are harmed by the failure to remove, the arguments made by the child's law­
yer co=only are carefully scrutinized and blame frequently follows. It is understandable, 
but lamentable, that these factors affect the professional role of a child's representative. 
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well mean that lawyers following Peters's model will choose to per­
mit their clients to set the objectives, even where statutes explicitly 
instruct lawyers to adhere to a best interests standard. The deter­
mined desire to empower children to direct their lawyers' choices 
may lead lawyers (a) to advocate objectives of children who are 
younger than courts would want to be so empowered and (b) to 
ignore rules instructing lawyers to represent a child's best interests. 
This second point may be troublesome to some. 
The troublesome quality is that it may be impossible for a judge 
ever to be sure whether the lawyer's arguments or recommenda­
tions are actually the product of the lawyer's independent views or 
merely reflect the preferences of the client. Even a direct order by 
a judge to an attorney instructing the lawyer to disregard his or her 
client's instructions regarding the objectives of the representation 
may be problematic.51 Of course, the problem disappears when the 
lawyer chooses to comply with the court's instructions. But the 
question remains how and when judges can ever detect whether 
lawyers who claim to be complying with their orders actually are 
not doing so. There are, after all, some limits on a court's capacity 
to interfere with the attorney-client relationship, even when the cli­
ent is a young child. 
In two ways, lawyers who are unsympathetic to a rule that binds 
them to disregard their clients' instructions regarding the objectives 
of the case may be able to thwart a court's attempt to oblige them 
to advocate an outcome based on the lawyer's independent assess­
ment of the case. First, it would appear lawyers would have a 
rather easy time ignoring such an instruction and invoking the 
attorney-client privilege when asked about the process by which 
they chose to advocate the particular position they took in a case. 
Alternatively, and shrewdly, lawyers may follow Peters's advice 
about how to frame arguments on their client's behalf when appear­
ing before judges who are disinclined to give great weight to the 
child's preferences. Good lawyers will mask reliance on their cli­
ent's preferences when arguing before courts known not to give 
much weight to a child's preferences. As Peters advises children's 
advocates, once lawyers know what results their clients want, it will 
commonly be strategically sound for the lawyers to "translate" the 
legal argument into the language of "best interests," so that judges 
51. The key question becomes: When does an attorney-client relationship commence -
when an attorney says so, or when a court does? If it commences only when a court says so, 
then arguably the court may attach any conditions it sees fit (regardless of the rules control­
ling the conduct of lawyers) when it assigns a member of the bar to serve a purpose other 
than as an attorney in an attorney-client relationship. If, however, an attorney-client rela­
tionship commences whenever an attorney is representing a client, then the rules governing 
attorney conduct - including the powerful one that attorneys must take their instruction 
from their unimpaired clients - may trump a court order restricting the duties of counsel. 
May 1999] Representing Children 1505 
will be more likely to decide the matter in accordance with the 
child's wishes.52 
III. THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING How TO DETERMINE 
THE ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR YOUNG CHILDREN 
Concealed in all discussions of the role of counsel for children 
are two distinct concepts that I will simply call "process" and "sub­
stance." By "process," I mean the formula by which the role of 
counsel is to be determined. "Substance" refers to the actual role 
of counsel for children in a particular setting. I have long been in­
trigued about the process of representing children.53 Peters has 
chosen in this book to emphasize the substance: what lawyers 
ought to do when representing children in child protective 
proceedings. 
But Peters does more than tell lawyers what they should do 
when representing children too young to determine the objectives 
the lawyer should seek. She also justifies the reasons lawyers are to 
do those things. In doing so, Peters has stepped precisely into my 
specialized focus of studying how to determine the role of counsel. 
And here, I believe, Peters has erred in her analysis. It is not that I 
challenge Peters's goal to cabin the discretion lawyers exercise 
when representing children. Nor do I question her advice about 
what lawyers for children should actually be doing in child protec­
tive proceedings - at least with regard to very young children. 
Rather, I challenge the method by which she recommends that law­
yers determine what they should advocate when representing very 
young children in child protective proceedings. 
I want to emphasize right away that this error has no bearing at 
all on the substance of her argument, which is not merely correct 
but wonderfully developed. Nonetheless, I want to try to demon­
strate that Peters is wrong about why lawyers should represent very 
young children in the manner she prescribes. One might wonder 
why I would want to do this when I think so highly of her book. 
The answer is precisely because I so strongly believe her book is 
correct about what lawyers for young children should do that I want 
to justify why they must do it in a way that is inarguable. I believe 
that Peters's analysis opens the door to advocates who disagree 
with her prescription, and who want to argue that lawyers for chil­
dren should do the opposite from what Peters would require. 
52. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1515. 
53. See generally Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel 
for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Repre­
sented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
76 (1984). 
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It is, of course, presumptive to call something "inarguable." By 
this term, I merely mean that what Peters has prescribed for law­
yers representing children too young to set the case objectives 
comes very close to being the corollary of the law as it is written in 
every state. Thus, advocates who wish to argue that Peters is wrong 
should be required to argue that the law of child protection is 
wrong. I believe, and have developed the argument elsewhere,s4 
that the role of counsel for young children in child protective cases 
is to seek outcomes based on the substantive law defining children's 
rights. Lawyers simply are not free to define for themselves what 
children's lawyers should do. This is no less true when the lawyer 
doing this defining is as perceptive as Peters. 
In the long run, it is essential to obtain agreement on determin­
ing the process by which the role of counsel is established. If I am 
right, this requires little more than studying substantive law. Once 
we know the controlling legal principles in any particular setting, 
we will be able to identify what lawyers representing young children 
should do. 
As discussed earlier in this review, the need to develop an argu­
ment of any kind for a particular role of counsel for very young 
children stems from a shared understanding of the desirability that 
lawyers for children not be free to impose their own values when 
advocating an outcome.ss The goal, in the words of Robyn-Marie 
Lyon, is to create a means by which lawyers are "guided by estab­
lished procedures and explicit factors to determine the child's 
position. "S6 
What is Peters's method that I am questioning? Peters recom­
mends that lawyers read for themselves various literature on child 
development theory.57 She believes it is important that lawyers ed­
ucate themselves by carefully reading theoretical and empirical 
work by scholars in the child developmental field (p. 132). After 
this critical reading, she recommends that a lawyer for children 
"draw on the hard work of other disciplines and bring the best of 
what those disciplines offer to his decision-making for his client" (p. 
132). 
*** 
54. See Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 
Sllpra note 53. 
55. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
56. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Colin· 
selfor Minors, 75 CAL. L. REv. 681, 691 (1987). Ann Haralambie and Deborah Glaser agree 
with this suggestion. See Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoreti· 
cal Problems with the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 57, 76-77 (1995). 
57. See p. 132 (advising lawyers to read the important literature in nonlegal fields). 
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Such an undertaking commonly means that lawyers will be ex­
pected to choose between diametrically opposed theories or, if they 
are as gifted a theorist as Peters is, to reconcile such theories (as 
Peters attempts to do as discussed in Part II). Once lawyers have 
made this choice, or have reconciled competing theories, the duties 
imposed on counsel are supposed to follow accordingly. The crucial 
question for purposes of reviewing Peters's book is: Who should be 
encouraged to synthesize these sharply contrasting ideas about the 
well-being of children? For Peters, the answer is lawyers assigned 
the delicate task of representing the children whose lives are di­
rectly impacted by judicial decisions.58 I do not agree. 
An important goal in defining the role of counsel - indeed, as 
Peters herself acknowledges, perhaps the most important objective 
- is to restrict the discretion of randomly chosen members of the 
bar. Peters is committed (as I am) to defining the role of counsel in 
a way that ensures lawyers will perform like tasks and make like 
arguments in similarly situated cases.59 But her very method of ar­
gument is structured to fail in the long run to create a uniform role 
for lawyers for young children. By arguing that lawyers should 
adopt a particular way of thinking about childrearing and the needs 
of children, and then use that way of thinking to guide them 
through the myriad choices lawyers need to make to advance the 
interests of their clients, Peters will succeed in creating uniformity 
of role performance only for those lawyers who are persuaded by 
her reasoning. Without realizing it, Peters has delivered a danger-
58. See p. 132. Peters is not the first writer to rely on her own views of what is good for 
children when intending to influence how lawyers representing children should behave. In­
deed, a good example of such is the effort of two other clinicians at Yale. Professors Stephen 
W1Zner and Miriam Berkman, who train law students to represent young children in custody 
proceedings, wrote an article in 1989 calculated both to explain how they decide what posi­
tions to advocate and to encourage other lawyers to follow their ideas. See Stephen W1Zner 
& Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical Study, 
68 NEB. L. REv. 330 (1989). In the article, these authors delineate factors they recommend 
lawyers use when representing young children in custody proceedings. Specifically, they pro­
duce nine "presumptions" they recommend lawyers use when deciding what position to ad­
vocate on behalf of children too young to set the objectives of the litigation. Among these 
"presumptions" is their 
principal presumption[ ]  that children ought to be in the custody of that parent who has, 
most consistently during the child's life, been the child's primary caregiver. Except in 
the most extreme circumstances, involving the actual inability of the primary caregiver 
to care for the child, a child should not be removed from the custody of the primary 
caregiver. 
Id. at 345. But their "presumptions" do not invariably comport with substantive law. Ac­
cording to Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin, for example, California law "does not 
embody any presumption in favor of primary caretakers, though in practice in disputed cases, 
some weight is undoubtedly given to maintaining continuity in the caretaker role." ELEANOR 
E. MAccoBY & ROBERT H. MNooKIN, DrvmING TiiE Cmm: SocIAL AND LEGAL DILEM­
MAS OF CuSTODY 81 (1992); see alSo Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the 
Limits of Law: On DIVIDING THE CHILD, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1808, 1809-10 (1994 (reviewing 
DIVIDING TiiE CHILD, supra). But see Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986). 
59. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1526. 
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ous concealed message: lawyers are free to disagree with her the­
ory about the needs of children and are even free to develop 
theories for themselves. Once lawyers have developed the theories 
they believe in, they may then implement them by representing 
young children in a manner that advances these theories. 
However persuasive her reasoning is (and I, for one, am quite 
persuaded by it), it is unimaginable that all members of the Bar will 
agree with her. Those who do not agree are no longer tethered by 
any particular guiding principle that would restrain the choices they 
need to make. Because Peters cannot hope to convince all practi­
tioners of her theory, nonbelievers will use a different method of 
representation based on their own theory of child development. 
Encouraging lawyers to decide which social scientists to credit in­
vites lawyers for young children to ignore the purposes and inten­
tions of the substantive law and substitute it with their own 
judgments. Theories of child development can be complicated, and 
the creation of substantive laws about children's rights can be ex­
traordinarily difficult. That is why, among other reasons, it is so 
important that these judgments be made by judges and legislators 
and not by randomly chosen members of the Bar acting as self­
appointed private lawmakers. Thus, even in the short run, Peters 
cannot possibly expect that everyone will follow her advice about 
what is good for children. 
Paradoxically, the greater Peters's contribution is in reconciling 
substantively competing child development theories, the less we 
should encourage individual members of the bar to choose one the­
ory over the other. The more controversial the substantive ideas 
that buttress the argument in favor of lawyers preferring a certain 
outcome, the less these ideas should be permitted to form the basis 
for deciding the role of counsel for young children. Ideally, the 
principles underpinning a child advocate's position should enjoy the 
support of most scholars and judges and legislators. When writers 
such as Peters examine the literature and recommend particular 
ideas as controlling principles for deciding cases about children, 
they are making an important contribution. But it is misguided to 
make this argument to the practicing bar. The proper role of young 
children's lawyers should simply be to enforce their clients' rights. 
Those rights derive from substantive law. For this reason, we 
should be encouraging lawyers to study the substantive law that de­
fines the rights of children and instructing lawyers to enforce those 
rights assiduously.60 
As I noted at the beginning of this Part, it turns out that the 
recommendations Peters makes to lawyers about what presump-
60. See Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 
supra note 53, at 1420-21. 
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tions they should be making and what outcomes they should be 
seeking are consistent with current law and policy. For example, 
lawyers who carefully follow Peters's advice when representing chil­
dren too young to set the objectives in their cases can be expected 
to fight aggressively to avoid the trauma of removing children from 
their families. Indeed, they will insist that removal be limited to 
compelling reasons of safety.61 When removal is required to pro­
tect a child from serious harm, the child's lawyer will insist that (a) 
the child be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting 
close to the child's community (ideally in a relative's home )62 and 
(b) that regular, frequent visitation be provided for the child and his 
or her parents and other important figures in the child's life.63 
These lawyers will also pay careful attention to the development of 
the case plan so that everyone has an early, clear idea of the obsta­
cles to returning the child to his or her family.64 They will also 
make certain that the parents be provided with assistance to help 
them regain their children's custody promptly;65 and when children 
have been living away from their parents for a significant period of 
time, that serious consideration be given to formally recognizing the 
now developed parent-child relationship that has resulted from the 
out-of-home placement.66 
But these principles will sound thoroughly familiar to readers 
who know the substantive law of child protection and foster care 
since 1980, when Congress passed the landmark Adoption Assist­
ance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.67 Many state statutes have 
codified the federal preference for keeping children with their fami­
lies. The introductory purpose clauses of the statutes commonly 
contain language similar to New York's, setting out the state's pur-
61. This is so because child developmentalists believe that children should not have their 
primary parental relationship disrupted unless there are compelling reasons to do so. 
62. See infra note 69. 
63. See infra note 69. 
64. See infra note 69. 
65. See infra note 69. 
66. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §103, 111 Stat. 2115, 
2118-20. 
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629e, 670-679a (1994). Under this Act, Congress mandated that 
states receiving federal money must comply with specifications designed to prevent unneces­
sary separation of children from their parents, to assure a careful monitoring of children who 
are separated, and to provide an infusion of services into the family to speed the ultimate 
return of children to their parents. Under current law, whenever a state removes a child 
from the custody of his or her parent, the state must develop an individualized case plan, 42 
U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994), which is required to provide for the child's placement "in the 
least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available and in close proxim­
ity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child," 42 
U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1994). To implement these principles and reduce the dangers to children 
associated with a child's separation from loved ones, a foster care placement based upon 
extended family relationships is preferable to a placement outside the family. 
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poses in language quite consistent with Peters's view of what is best 
for children. 68 
To the extent that Peters's views about what is best for children 
reflects substantive law - and they do to a remarkable extent -
she is on the firmest possible ground for arguing what lawyers for 
children should be trying to achieve on behalf of their young clients. 
But lawyers should be acting for reasons radically different from 
those proposed by Peters. The lawyers' role should not be justified 
because current social science theory supports it or because a par­
ticular scholar is persuaded of its correctness. Instead, their role is 
to behave in a particular manner because the legislature or courts 
have decided that these principles are correct. Though the lawyers' 
role is not immutable, its changeability depends not on members of 
the practicing bar changing their minds, nor on scholars changing 
theirs, but on lawmakers changing theirs. That is how it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
Part of Peters's book is written to the wrong audience and says 
the wrong things to the audience of practicing lawyers. When 
Peters attempts to blend competing child developmental theories, 
the audience she should be addressing is policymakers. This under­
taking allows her to make an extremely valuable contribution to 
our understanding of the needs of children. But other scholars 
making similar contributions do not conceive of their work as being 
directed to lawyers for children. 69 Instead, the principal audience is 
judges, legislators, policymakers, and other scholars who are writing 
about what children need to thrive. But Peters's audience, at least 
as I understand it, is primarily meant to be lawyers who will be 
representing children. These lawyers ought not be encouraged to 
become policymakers when representing children, or even to think 
68. New York's statute declares that: 
(i) it is desirable for children to grow up with a normal family life in a permanent home 
and that such circumstance offers the best opportunity for children to develop and 
thrive; 
(ii) it is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural 
parent because the child's need for a normal family life will usually best be met in 
the natural home, and that parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless 
the best interests of the child would be thereby endangered; 
(iii) the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up 
or to reunite it if the child has already left home . . . .  
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a)(i)-(iii) (McKinney 1992). 
69. The works of prominent theorists such as Joseph Goldstein and Peggy Davis, for ex­
ample, are not aimed at how lawyers should act when representing children, but rather at the 
principles upon which trial judges should decide cases, appellate judges should make law, or 
legislators should enact law. Obviously, scholars such as Goldstein and Davis recognize that 
their work ultimately will impact the things lawyers representing children should do. But 
their goals are to influence the substantive rules by which cases are decided. Once that has 
been accomplished, these scholars would expect lawyers representing children to conform 
their behavior to the law. 
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in terms of liberating themselves to answer weighty questions such 
as what substantive rules best serve their client's needs. 
All law about child custody, including even child protection, 
must be grounded in theory. This theory is not immutable - far 
from it. When the law changes in accordance with these theories, 
there is a full and fair opportunity to challenge the theories and 
amend them over time. But when we allow - and even encourage 
- private members of the bar to advocate on behalf of a young 
child in accordance with a child developmental theory that has not 
been incorporated into law, two serious problems arise. First, child 
advocates will be free to disagree about which theory to endorse. 
This will create chaos in differential representation. Second, child 
advocates will in effect have become private lawmakers. This may 
not appear to be much of a problem at first glance. Advancing the 
law in a progressive direction is a good to be supported. But let's 
look at this phenomenon slightly differently. Instead of calling this 
"advancing" the law, we might more accurately call it undermining 
the law (much as a civil disobedient does). 
Children's advocates who want the substantive law to change 
should not try to persuade lawyers of such a need. Even if success­
ful in the short run, their contribution to the subject of what lawyers 
should do will not survive the next wave of social science theory, 
unless their arguments move from the relatively obscure world of 
principles on which lawyers for children ought to operate, to the 
highly visible one of principles on which judges are to decide cases. 
In other words, Peters should be telling lawyers not what good the­
ory is, but what good practice is. Good practice for lawyers is not to 
take the law into their own hands, nor to figure out for themselves 
which competing child developmental theory is correct. It should 
be only to determine what the law says is a child's right. 
None of this is to say that the readers of Peters's book should 
refrain from following carefully Peters's brilliant advice about how 
to be strategic advocates for their clients. I, for one, would be ex­
tremely pleased if lawyers representing children became faithful ad­
herents to Peters's prescriptions for practice. My disagreement is 
solely over how Peters comes to her conclusions. I only hope law­
yers pay more attention to what Peters says about what they should 
be doing on behalf of their clients and less attention to the reason­
ing that leads Peters to her conclusions. 
